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29 September 1992 marks the 20th anniversary of the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between China and Japan. The anniversary will be 
commemorated by the visit of Japanese Emperor Akihito to China-the first time a 
Japanese monarch has visited China-in October. In 1978，Japan and China signed 
the Long-Term Trade Agreement and the Peace and Friendship Treaty signalling the 
start of a new era of closeness and cooperation in bilateral relations unheard of in 
their long and complex relationship. However, due to numerous factors including--
culture, politics, economics, and history--the relationship has reached heights of 
euphoria as well as the lower reaches of hell within short periods of time. 
This paper will examine the underlying causes and relevant features of Sino-
Japanese relations during the period from 1978 to 1988 within the context of the 
domestic issues affecting both nations at the time in order to better understand some 
of the current issues facing the relationship. While there never seemed to be any 
doubt that China and Japan would pursue mutually cooperative policies, there have 
been a surprising number of turnabouts in the perceptions the two countries have 
of one another and of their relationship. These inconsistencies can be explained by 
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four major themes prevalent in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, namely : 
1) differing economic expectations, 2) changing perceptions of the global balance 
of power, 3) effects of domestic politics and internal competition for power, and 4) 
the dichotomy of commonality versus a history of hatred. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction: Themes in Sino-Japanese Relations 
I. Introduction: Themes in Sino-Japanese Relations 
29 September 1992 will mark the 20th anniversary of the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Both countries have been readying 
themselves for the event through a series of reciprocal activities which have included 
political, economic, and cultural exchanges. The celebration will culminate in a 
historic visit by Japanese Emperor Akihito to China in October. While the 
anniversary is overshadowed by historical antagonisms, in particular Japan's past 
aggressions against China and resultant fears of renewed Japanese militarism, both 
countries have made efforts to put aside the past in order to further the relationship. 
It can be said that the future geopolitical and economic configuration of Asia 
will in large part be determined by the shape and nature of the relations between 
these two countries-one home to one-fifth the world's population, and the other, the 
world's second most economically powerful. If the relationship is one of 
cooperation, the two will dominate the region. However, if the relationship 
deteriorates into a bitter rivalry, the Asia-Pacific region could very well face difficult 
economic and political times.i 
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This sentiment was expressed more recently by Chinese Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen at a meeting in Beijing with a visiting Tokyo Shimhun delegation on 
12 May 1992: 
Japan and China are neighbors, and they are the most important 
countries in Asia. As history has proved, peace cannot be achieved in 
Asia if Japan and China should conflict or clash with one another. If 
both countries maintain friendly relations, this will help bring about 
not only peace but also prosperity to Asia. Politicians with insight 
have maintained that Japan and China should maintain friendly 
relations from generation to generation? 
In order to gain insight into some of the current issues in the bilateral 
relationship, in view of the 20th anniversary, this thesis will examine underlying 
causes and relevant features of the Sino-Japanese relationship from 1978 to 1988 
within the context of domestic issues affecting both nations at the time. 
Looking back over the ten years of this review, it is evident that the Sino-
Japanese relationship was not always as cordial as one might suspect. While there 
never seemed to be any doubt that the two countries would pursue mutually 
cooperative policies, there were a surprising number of turnabouts in the perceptions 
that they had of one another and of the relationship. These inconsistencies can be 
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explained by four major themes prevalent in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations: 
1) differing economic expectations, 2) changing perceptions of the global balance of 
power，3) the effects of domestic politics and internal competition for power, and 4) 
the dichotomy of commonality versus a history of hatred. 
Theme #1，differing economic expectations, will focus on the Long-Term 
Trade Agreement which helped set the stage in the relationship from 1978. Theme 
#2，changing perceptions of the global balance of power, will examine the China-
Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty which was also signed in that year. The issues 
surrounding the signing of the treaty indicate the influence of Cold War policies, 
particularly perceptions of the Soviet threat to the security of both sides. Theme #3, 
the effects of domestic politics and internal competition for power, will highlight 
some of the domestic political maneuverings that influence each country's outward 
policies toward the other. Finally, theme #4，the dichotomy of commonality versus 
a history of hatred, will discuss lingering Chinese memories of Japanese militarism 
and concern for its revival. 
Because China and Japan have much in common culturally, the two countries 
have very high expectations for economic and political compatibility. For example, 
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when China deals with the United States, or when Japan deals with Russia, there is 
very little common ground in social custom; there is no shared Confucian heritage; 
there is no similarity in writing systems and no history of significant cultural 
borrowing between one country and the other. However, China and Japan have all 
these commonalities between them, and as a result there is a tendency for the two 
to expect that their relationship should somehow be special. 
Consider for example the statement made by Mitsui Company chairman, 
Ikeda Yoshizo in assessing the relationship: 
Here is a land with enormous potential. The people there have a 
complexion similar to ours. We may not speak the same language, but 
we can communicate because we use the same script. We are thus 
more relaxed in each other's company than with Westerners. Also, 
we have long historical ties...We can understand their sentiments 
because of the similarities of the people. So I think we should be able 
to help each other both spiritually and materially? 
It seems clear that the well-entrenched historical and cultural biases and 
assumptions are in place when the Chinese formulate and execute their Japan policy. 
Whether China perceives Japan, shadowed in the blood of its past aggression, as a 
willing banker with a guilty streak, or as a nation of economic animals waiting to 
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make another grab for their Motherland, these stereotypes, tried and tested, seemed 
to have served the purposes of both sides well over the years. 
The literature covering the bilateral relationship highlights these historical 
biases and assumptions. For example, in his introduction to China and Japan: A 
Search for Balance Since World War L Robert A. Scalapino claims the first Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95) marked the great watershed, not merely in the relations 
between the two states, but in China's relations with the rest of the world. 
According to Scalapino, China's perceptions of Japan in the modern era and how 
these perceptions influenced China's future Japan policy began with this event: 
Poverty, corruption, lax organization, an effete military-these could be 
accepted by the Chinese elite of the late nineteenth century with 
considerable equanimity as the prices to be paid for a system which-
all things considered-was considered superior to any within their 
(highly limited) range of knowledge. But military defeat at the hands 
of the Japanese, a people whom they had always considered with a 
high degree of condescension, could not be accepted by the elite, 
especially by that younger element that stood on the threshold of 
governance.'^ 
Likewise, Rajendra Kumar Jain in China and Japan 1949-1980 states that the 
opening up of China by the Western imperialists and the defeat of China at the 
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hands of the Japanese caused the Chinese social system to disintegrate and the 
people to suffer untold humiliations at the hands of the "foreign devils."^ Even in 
1871，over 20 years before the Sino-Japanese War, Meiji Japan tried forcing China 
to submit to an unequal treaty, as the Western powers had done, but was rebuffed. 
However, this marked a shift in the once inferior tributary state's actions toward the 
Middle Kingdom. 
In Sino-Japanese Relations-China's Perspective. Laura Newby tackles the 
problem of interpreting the two countries' relationship while relying on the old links 
to provide a foundation for her arguments. She states that centuries of Sino-
Japanese interaction, both positive and negative, have given rise to an emotionally 
charged relationship. In the 20th century, China's traditional role as Japan's cultural 
benefactor was dramatically reversed when China became a victim of Japanese 
imperialism and suffered almost 50 years of political humiliation, territorial loss, and 
human tragedy. In somewhat Freudian terms, Newby follows that China and Japan 
are bound by a complex psychological heritage in a relationship which is 
characterized on all levels by feelings of superiority and inferiority, pride and shame, 
arrogance and humility, 
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Many Chinese today still have vivid memories of the Japanese invading their 
country and are concerned with renewed Japanese militarism-the opposition to 
Japan's participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and the 
request for war reparations, including compensation by former war comfort women 
are examples of how heated issues of contention arise over past events. At the same 
time in Japan, there are still outspoken ultranationalists who have nothing but 
disdain for their giant neighbor. An example is the recent criticism by a top 
Japanese foreign ministry official, Koji Kakizawa, Parliamentary Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. His comments were made at a Tokyo symposium marking the 20th 
anniversary of resumption of diplomatic ties, and at a time when Beijing has taken 
a relatively low-key stand on war related issues. Kakizawa complained that despite 
Japanese economic aid, China continues to fuss over World War II: "I would hope 
that the fact that Japan led the way in re-establishing economic aid to China after 
the Tiananmen incident, for example, is taken to be a gesture of indirect 
compensation...! hope that both sides will bear in mind that the future cannot be 
built if we are all busy fussing about the past."? His speech appeared to reflect 
Japanese irritation that the conciliatory stance toward China after 1989 and the 
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resumption of aid--which he said functioned "virtually as a substitute for war 
reparations"--in the midst of continued Western criticism, had not stopped "hurtful 
criticism focusing on...reminders of the war."^ 
The focus on the past is highlighted further in Chalmers Johnson article, 
"How China and Japan See Each Other , Johnson bases Sino-Japanese perceptions 
on three specific historical occurrences: 1) Differing reactions to Western 
imperialism in relation to modernization, 2) Japan's pre-World War I role model 
status for Chinese modernizers, which later soured, and 3) Japan's military 
intervention in China between 1937 and 1945. Johnson also raises the point of 
contention among some scholars of whether the common Sinitic background of the 
Chinese and Japanese helps or hinders their relationship and understanding. Often 
appeals to common backgrounds are employed by both sides when issues involving 
gain or Sino-Japanese harmony are involved. 
Like Johnson, Allen Whiting in his book, China Eyes Japan, seems convinced 
that the common background between the two countries adds little, if not detracts 
from Sino-Japanese relations. While Johnson goes so far as to say it gives their 
squabbles the nature of a family feud, Whiting states that the combination of the two 
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country's tangled cultures and histories calls into question even the possibility of the 
two working out a solid and rational relationship. 
Newby takes a much stronger "international relations" approach to the study 
of the bilateral relationship as she concerns herself more with the politico-strategic 
issues involved in Sino-Japanese relations, and tries to redress the habit of western 
commentators, whom she sees as studying the relationship "within a purely economic 
f r amewo rk .He r book can only add to what Whiting has supplied, while offering 
little new analysis. Both Newby and Whiting tackle the problems of culture and 
history, and proceed onto an in depth politico-economic analysis covering loans, 
technology transfer, investment, and the Baoshan steel project. 
The latter topic, the Baoshan steel complex, is given special emphasis in 
Chae-Jin Lee's China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy along with the Bohai 
Gulf project. But his economic focus is what Newby would probably call 
"unbalanced" since it divorces Sino-Japanese economic relations from the political 
realities. Lee, unlike the other scholars mentioned here, sees Sino-Japanese 
relations as strong, with even a kind of natural affinity between the two peoples that 
might surprise even some Chinese. 
9 
In contrast, Chih-yu Shih's The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy. A 
Psychocultural View reviews the institutional structures of the Chinese foreign policy 
machine and some of the more prominent political personalities involved in the 
Chinese foreign policy decision-making process. Shih's work is crucial to 
understanding Sino-Japanese relations from a Chinese perspective, especially in 
explaining how the "Chinese world view" plays so deep a part in China's foreign 
policy. Chapters such as "Chinese Psychoculture and Foreign Policy Motivation" and 
"Face Diplomacy: Leaders and Norms in Foreign Policy" do much to de-mystify 
Chinese foreign policy in terms of Sino-Japanese relations. 
The importance of Shih's work is highlighted when reviewing A. Doak 
Barnett's book, The Making of Foreign Policy in China. While Barnett's book is 
invaluable in his step-by-step coverage of the Chinese foreign policy apparatus, and 
the major political bodies involved in the process, he like many other Sinologists only 
proved the "inscrutability" of the Chinese when he assured the reader of the ever 
increasing hold on power in 1985 of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. 
A review of the literature on Sino-Japanese relations has thus led me to two 
conclusions based on the shared culture and history: 1) with the exception of the 
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Cold War element in the literature, the books, even those written as long as 12 years 
ago, remain up-to-date and useful as sources because they are in fact historical 
portraits; and 2) Sino-Japanese relations take on a historical aura because of the 
longstanding and complex relations the two cultures have shared for centuries. 
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CHAPTER II 
Differing Economic Expectations 
II. Differing Economic Expectations 
February through October 1978 were probably the most exciting and 
optimistic months in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Two major documents--
the Long-Term Trade Agreement (LTTA) and the China-Japan Peace and 
Friendship Treaty (PFT) were signed. These two documents would set the stage for 
Sino-Japanese relations for the next decade and would be the basis for the 
expectations the two countries would have of each other. The LTTA came into 
being through the careful negotiations conducted by Liu Xiwen, China's then vice-
minister for Foreign Trade, and Inayama Yoshihiro, then Chairman of Nippon Steel 
Corporation and president of Keidanren (Japan's Federation of Economic 
Organizations). But the agreement really came about because of the Fifth National 
People's Congress in February and March 1978. It was during this Congress that 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Hua Guofeng laid out his ambitious 
Ten-Year Plan (1976-1985) which called for an 85 percent annual increase in the 
mechanization of agriculture, a 10 percent annual increase in manufacturing, and 
plans for 120 large-scale construction projects.u Suddenly, it seemed there would 
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be real opportunities for Japan to play a major role in China's modernization. The 
LTTA was the product of Sino-Japanese enthusiasm for this opportunity. 
The agreement called for US$20 billion worth of trade over eight years. 
Japan was to export US$10 billion worth of technology, plants and construction 
materials in exchange for an equal value of Chinese crude oil and coal.12 Thus the 
agreement appeared to be very balanced and representative of a high degree of 
trade compatibility between the two countries. 
There is some question, however, as to whether Japan really wanted Chinese 
oil. One argument is that Japan was concerned about energy shortages in 1978 and 
was very anxious to have Chinese oil imports. With the energy crisis of 1973，the 
creation of OPEC, Japan's high degree of reliance on oil imports from an 
increasingly unstable Middle East, concern over the vulnerability of long shipping 
lanes in the event of war, and rising oil prices, the argument holds that Japan was 
hoping to shift its oil supply sources to China.^ ^ 
Another argument posits that Japan did not want Chinese oil, but decided to 
import it as a concession. Japanese oil refineries were particularly upset with the 
LTTA because the Japanese government was in essence, forcing them to buy "heavy 
13 
Chinese oil with high paraffin content which they (the Japanese oil refiners) claimed 
was 20 to 30 percent overpriced in terms of quality.— Japanese oil refiners were 
also concerned about having to build new refineries that would be capable of 
handling the high paraffin content.^^ On the other hand, by making the concession 
of importing high quantities of Chinese crude, Inayama must have thought that the 
political gain with China was worth the costs. And by enabling China to export its 
oil, Japan could possibly open the doors for its steel industry to export larger 
amounts to China.^^ 
Given the fact that Inayama was the chairman of Nippon Steel Corporation 
and a representative of the steel industry in various capacities, it would not seem so 
surprising that he would conclude an agreement that would help the steel industry 
at the expense of the oil refiners. Most likely the Japanese decision was based on 
both arguments. Certainly the incentive for the steel industry was there, and possibly 
Inayama and others truly believed that China could become a viable oil supplier in 
the future. Many Chinese leaders and foreign oil experts made very optimistic 
estimates of China's oil productivity which offered some basis for Japanese optimism. 
But it would soon become clear that those estimates were ridiculously high and 
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unscientific.^^ 
The LTTA came about largely because of the economic plan that Hua 
Guofeng laid out during the Fifth National People's Congress. This plan, with its 
emphasis on large-scale construction projects and mechanization of agriculture was 
ideally suited to Japan's desire to export huge amounts of machinery, construction 
materials and plants. But as Deng Xiaoping began to gain more power, China's 
economic agenda began to change since the "Dengists could not afford an economic 
policy which, emulating Stalin and Brezhnev, concentrated on heavy industry and 
military weaponry at the expense of the consumer economy."is 
Hua's plan, which differed from the traditional Maoist model of economic 
development, called for massive imports of Western equipment and technology); 
His plan was strongly supported by the so-called "Petroleum Group," which was a 
group of vice-premiers and ministers who were charged with various duties related 
to the petroleum, metal, and chemical industries. This group advocated Hua's Ten-
Year Plan because they believed (or had the incentive to believe) that the huge 
foreign purchases necessary for the plan could be financed by huge increases in 
China's petroleum output and exports.^ ^ 
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By December 1978，Hua Guofeng and the Petroleum Group had lost much 
of their influence due to the cancellation of the Ten-Year Plan during the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee. In turn, a three-year readjustment 
program was implemented under the leadership of newly reinstated Vice-Chairman 
of the Central Committee, Chen Yun. Chen was a harsh critic of Hua's plan and 
believed that China's economic policy should focus more on the daily welfare of the 
Chinese people.^^ Under the readjustment program, heavy industry would be cut 
back and much more emphasis would be put on light industry and agriculture. New 
material incentives would be introduced for production, new awards and penalties 
would be applied to individual managers and entities, and experiments would be 
made with new forms of industrial organization.^^ 
The Third Plenum was a major victory for Deng Xiaoping. In addition to 
having his ally Chen Yun reinstated, three other Deng supporters were given 
powerful positions: Hu Yaobang was selected as CCP Secretary-General and 
Propaganda Chief, and Deng Yingchao and Wang Zhen were elected to the 
Politburo.23 The Third Plenum thus reflected a decisive shift of influence from 
Hua to Deng and set the stage for the policy adjustments of 1979 and 1980. 
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That changes in Chinese economic policy would soon occur was first signalled 
by an editorial in the People,s Daily, which called for a reduction in iron and steel 
investments and more emphasis on light industry and agriculture. Concurrently a 
Chinese delegation in Tokyo negotiating contracts on oil development and plant 
( 
construction, abruptly ended discussions and left Japan. In August 1979，Vice-
Premier Gu Mu offered assurances to the Japanese that the economic plans laid out 
in 1978 were not going to be cancelled, but merely revised.^^ But drastic changes 
had already been made in regard to the Baoshan steel mill. 
Development of the Chinese steel industry was at the core of Hua's Ten-Year 
Plan. He had hoped to double domestic steel output in eight years through 
modernizing and expanding seven existing steel plants and through the construction 
of three integrated steel plant complexes: Baoshan, Jidong and Anshan. Baoshan 
was to be the most daring and costly industrial project ever undertaken in China; it 
was the pet project of Hua and the symbol of his economic policies.^^ With Hua's 
decreasing influence and Chen Yun's move away from heavy industry, it is not 
surprising that Baoshan would become an object of attack. 
A basic agreement had originally been reached between Japan and China on 
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the Baoshan steel mill on 22 December 1978 which divided the project into two 
phases with respective completion targets of 1 October 1981 and January 1983. The 
total Japanese contracts for both phases totalled 500 billion yen. Nippon Steel 
Corporation was involved in the planning, construction and management of the 
project, which was an unprecedented degree of involvement for a foreign company 
in China , 
It came as a great disappointment then for the Japanese when in February 
1979，only two months after signing the basic agreement, China froze 22 contracts 
with Japan which amounted to US$2.7 billion. China's explanation at the time was 
that Japan's financing terms were not favorable, but more likely the freezing of the 
Baoshan contracts reflected the new economic policy debate in China? By that 
summer, plant contracts were resumed, but China reduced its steel target while 
Japan offered to make concessions on the financing.^^ 
The year of 1979 also saw a change in China's policy on foreign loans. 
Whereas China had always been very cautious about borrowing money, Chinese 
thinking now seemed to be that loans would be essential to carrying out the Four 
Modernizations program. Vice-Premier Li Xiannian estimated that US$600 billion 
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would be needed to complete the modernization program, and Gu Mu, during a 
September visit to Tokyo requested government loans of US$5.5 billion. Japan was 
apprehensive about lending to China in the wake of the policy adjustments, but 
ended up lending US$2 billion all the same. 
The change in loan policy seems to have coincided with the realization of the 
Dengists that oil exports would not be a feasible means of financing China's 
modernization drive. The change in oil policy and the waning influence of the 
Petroleum Group was revealed in 1979 when Japan's oil quota from the Middle East 
was reduced in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Japan asked China to provide 
an extra 500,000 tons of oil to make up for the reduction, but the request was turned 
down, 
China tried to increase foreign investment in 1979 and a law on joint ventures 
was drawn up which limited a foreign investment to 49 percent of the total capital, 
and in August Yu Quili suggested that even 100 percent foreign investment and 
directorship would be welcomed.^^ 
The economic adjustments of 1979 were just a foreshadowing of a much 
greater conflict to come. That conflict came in 1980 with China's decision to make 
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major contract postponements with Japan as an economic crisis within the PRC 
became imminent. 
During 1980 China's budget deficit reached 10 percent of the total budget, 
inflation in the urban areas soared to 15 percent, and ten million people were 
imemployed.32 These economic circumstances, combined with political 
restructuring in China, resulted in an another shift away from the Ten-Year Plan. 
In February 1980，Hua Guofeng lost several of his most important allies 
(Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, and Chen Xilian), while Chen Yun's influence 
was bolstered by the appointment of Yao Yilin, Wan Li, Wang Renzhong, and Hu 
Qiaomu to the new eleven-member Secretariat of the CCP.^ ^ With this shift of 
power in place and with current economic conditions as supporting data, the heart 
of Hua's economic program-the Baoshan Steel Mill-began to undergo serious 
attack.^ 
The first public criticism of Baoshan was offered by Vice-Premier Bo Yibo 
in July 1980. He argued that Baoshan's technology was more of a burden than an 
asset to China since the technology was not appropriate for China's current stage of 
development.^^ Bo's complaint was followed by a public complaint that Baoshan 
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was consuming too much energy, and with private complaints that Japan engaged in 
forms of cheating, including the shipment of used equipment to China.^ ^ 
During the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (August and 
September 1980) some further anti-Japanese sentiments were expressed and the 
debate over Baoshan reached its peak. Deng Xiaoping may have taken advantage 
of the opportunity to link Baoshan and China's current economic problems with Hua 
and the Petroleum Group, thereby discrediting the Baoshan project.^^ In 
November 1980 China's State Council decided, without consultation with the 
Japanese, that the second phase of Baoshan would be postponed.^^ 
Throughout the Chinese criticisms of the Baoshan project and of the 
Japanese, Vice-Premier Gu Mu had successfully assured the Japanese that these 
criticism were entirely a domestic matter and would not affect Japanese interests in 
Baoshaii.39 The postponement of Baoshan thus came as a considerable shock--
US$1.3 billion worth of Japanese contracts were immediately affected, and another 
US$900 million worth of Japanese contracts related to Baoshan would possibly be 
affected.40 In the hope of averting major damage to Sino-Japanese relations, Tokyo 
dispatched economist and former foreign minister Okita Saburo to Beijing as a 
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special representative of the Japanese government. There he and his delegation 
received this explanation: 
…[W]e were told that after expelling the Gang of Four the new 
leadership had sought support for their "Four Modernizations" 
program by raising wages and increasing procurement of prices of 
agricultural products, but this had the effect of increasing inflation and 
the budget deficit. It had therefore become necessary to relieve 
bottlenecks in energy and communications, and severe cuts had to be 
made in other construction investment, including steel and 
petrochemicals. The situation was further aggravated by earlier over-
optimistic estimates of oil production and foreign exchange earnings, 
which meant that a significant reduction now had to be made in 
capital expenditure and equipment imports. On the external 
repercussions of China's cancellation of foreign orders, Deputy 
Premiers Gu Mu, Yao Yilin and Deng Xiaoping stated that China was 
a country that valued its reputation and would never cause trouble to 
other countries.41 
Even if Japanese political and business leaders were persuaded by these 
arguments or were aware of the current economic realities in China, the decisions 
were disappointing, and in the manner in which those decisions were announced (i.e. 
suddenly and without Japanese consultation) was even more disappointing/^ In the 
end, it would take two years of loan negotiations before the projects could be 
revitalized. 
During 1983 and 1984 China began to incur a huge trade deficit with Japan. 
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However, 
1984 marked the beginning of a sharp turnaround in the balance of 
trade. Japanese machinery exports to China doubled and steel rose 
20 percent. Enhanced consumer spending power helped Japanese 
television sales increase five-fold; sales of refrigerators and washing 
machines tripled. Most dramatic of all was the increase in automobile 
exports, up 11 times over the previous year. Not even China's 
increased sales of crude oil (up 13 percent) and textiles (up 42 
percent) could counteract the US$1 billion trade surplus Japan gained 
that year.43 
China hoped that through importing more consumer goods, inflation might 
be slowed down. Foreign investment was encouraged, and fourteen new cities were 
opened along China's coast for foreign business operations. And during his eight-day 
visit to Japan, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang emphasized the attractiveness 
of joint ventures, cooperative development and co-production. He assured Japan 
that China's open-door policy would continue and that China was working on 
perfecting its laws and regulations. Hu also stated that Japan need not worry about 
the PRC breaking its promises/^ 
The resurgence of cooperation in Sino-Japanese economic relations was 
expressed in more concrete terms with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone's visit to China. There he presented the PRC with a US$2.1 billion low 
interest official development loan for seven major industrial projects. He also 
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promised that additional loans would be made available for the development of 
energy resources,? 
The growth in Japanese imports that began in 1984 continued in 1985 
China's foreign exchange reserves dropped deeply and its trade deficit with Japan 
reached nearly US$6 billion.46 Sales of Japanese consumer products jumped 200 
percent with Japanese vehicles registering a 500 percent increase in sales.^ ^ A 
policy that had been implemented to curb inflation had clearly grown out of hand. 
Besides China's experiment with a more liberal import policy, there were 
some fundamental problems with the trade structure between Japan and China. In 
1978，Japan and China seemed like very compatible trade partners-China exporting 
natural energy resources in exchange for Japanese technology. But this model 
relationship was truly too idealistic. Chinese oil was not up to par, China needed 
its oil for domestic use, and in 1985 petroleum prices dropped--a further drawback 
to the scheme. If China increased oil exports, the price would drop even fiirther.48 
As this basic contradiction of a country with energy shortages trying to 
eliminate a trade deficit through energy resource exports became increasingly 
problematic, Chinese leaders tried to shift Chinese exports from natural resources 
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to manufactured goods. This shift was unwelcome in Japan. The Japanese worried 
that a developed China would compete with Japanese domestic manufacturers and 
were thus unwilling to provide China with new technology: 
The Japanese fear that Chinese export products made with Japanese 
technology will be aimed at the Japanese domestic or overseas 
markets. Thus in an agreement being negotiated between Nissan 
Motors and Jilin provincial authorities to build a pick-up truck and 
van plant, Nissan insisted that the province agree not to export the 
completed vehicles.^^ 
During 1986 and 1987，Japanese investment in China had been on the 
decline. During the first quarter of 1986 there was a 12 percent decline in Japanese 
investment in and Japan's investment pledges represented less than 10 
percent of the total pledged by foreign companies (in contrast to its 29 percent share 
of foreign trade with China).^ ^ The lack of enthusiasm for investment in China 
seemed mainly due to Japanese disillusionment with the PRC bureaucracy. Japanese 
business people had been complaining about the inadequate legal framework in 
China, the restrictions on profit repatriation, unreasonable land-use fees, too much 
required paperwork, sudden negotiation cancellations by the Chinese without 
explanation, the inability of the Chinese to cope with high technology, and 
unmotivated Chinese managers and employees.^^ 
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On 10 October 1986, China announced new measures designed to attract 
more foreign investment. These measures included standardized land-use fees, 
exemption from staff subsidies other than labor and welfare outlays, reduction of 
water, electricity, communication and transportation fees, some new tax provisions, 
the freedom of the foreign enterprises to hire and fire workers as well as determine 
employee salaries, and the right to refuse "unreasonable charges." Local officials 
in China would hence forth be required to announce their decisions on investment 
applications within 90 days, and preferential treatment would be given to companies 
that brought in advanced technology. Special concessions would also be made to any 
company that, after forwarding profits to its home country, still had a surplus of 
foreign exchange.�� 
Despite these incentives, reaction by the Japanese and other foreign investors 
was far from enthusiastic. The measures did not alleviate the problem of foreign 
exchange convertibility, and investors were sceptical of the incentives for bringing in 
high technology since the Chinese did not define what exactly they considered to be 
"high technology." Taxes had apparently never been a significant problem in the 
minds of foreign investors in China, but the housing and school shortage in Beijing 
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and Shanghai, and the state surveillance of private homes had been serious 
disincentives, and these were not addressed in the new measures.^^ 
By 1986 there was an improvement in the bilateral trade relationship 
inasmuch as the huge Chinese trade deficit was reduced through the appreciation of 
the yen and the reduction of Chinese purchases of Japanese consumer products. 
Japanese exports dropped 23.5 percent in the first half of 1986，but Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves were only US$10 billion in 1986，down from US$16 billion in 
1984. Part of the problem was that Japan's imports from China remained minimal, 
and much of the reduction in imports from Japan was merely replaced with 
increased imports from the United States and West Germany. Japan's share of 
machinery and transport equipment sales to the PRC dropped from 53 percent in 
1985 to 37 percent in the first half of 1986. Japan's share in telecommunication sales 
to China during the same periods dropped from 77 percent to 58 percent, and in 
office machine and ADP equipment from 47 percent to 34 percent? 
China seemed to be going out of its way to promote exports from Europe as 
if to snub Japan for not being more responsive to various Chinese demands? But 
besides this shift away from Japan to Europe for certain products, there was a 
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notable shift in the type of products China imported from Japan. In 1986 Chinese 
imports of Japanese cars and motorcycles were less than half of what they were in 
1985，while production facilities and raw and processed industrial materials from 
Japan increased substantially.^^ 
China made progress on selling more of its commodities to Japan. Fish 
exports to Japan in 1986 were 70 percent higher than in 1985, and during the same 
period fibre exports increased 18 percent. China also began to sell some scientific 
equipment to Japan，But these gains are overshadowed by China's inability to sell 
Japan more coal and oil. China's coal prices were quite attractive to Japan, but due 
to pressures from Japanese suppliers, Japan bought domestically at higher prices.^^ 
In terms of oil sales, China provided only 6.5 percent of Japan's oil imports.^ ® With 
the drop in crude oil prices in 1986, China's volume of oil exports to Japan was only 
54.3 percent of its 1985 volume.^^ 
As noted earlier, China was not able to meet its promised exports of oil to 
Japan as laid out in the LTTA. But at the same time, Japan's concern over the 
security of its oil flows from the Middle East seems to have decreased since the 
signing of the agreement. Japan imports 99 percent of its oil, 70 percent of which 
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comes from the Middle East, and 60 percent of which is transported through the 
Persian Gulf. One would suspect that with the recent crisis in the Gulf, that Japan 
would be working hard to develop China's oil fields and refineries, and that China 
would be in a prime negotiating position. Such is not the case however. Instead, 
Japan has made major diplomatic initiatives with various countries in the Middle 
East, and has striven to shift more of its imports to small oil producing countries 
so as to have more negotiating power; importing half of a country's oil, for example, 
provides Japan with considerable leverage. Lastly, Japan is doing extensive scientific 
research in alternative forms of energy. The United States dabbled in alternative 
energy sources for a while during the Carter Administration, but Japan never 
stopped its research-even when the earlier energy crisis of the 1970s was over.62 
Thus while China has been limited in its oil exports to Japan by its own domestic 
needs for oil as well as the poor quality of Chinese crude, its potential role as an 
exporter of oil to Japan may be further limited by the lack of immediate Japanese 
need and interest. 
These comments are not meant to diminish the importance of Sino-Japanese 
trade, however, as Japan is one of China's leading trade partners and responsible for 
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50 percent of all Chinese oil exports and 20 percent of all Chinese food and 
chemical exports. And while Japan expects that its trade with China will level off 
for a while, Japan is still providing the PRC with half of its steel and 40 percent of 
its machinery, transport equipment, and other manufactured goods.^ ^ 
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CHAPTER III 
Perceptions of the Global Balance of Power 
I 
III. Perceptions of the Global Balance of Power 
Chinese and Japanese policies toward one another have been affected by 
their individual perceptions of the global balance of power-specifically the degree 
to which the former Soviet Union seemed threatening. From approximately 1978 
to 1980，China was extremely concerned about the USSR having gained superiority 
over the United States in Asia•似 As a result the PRC became more sympathetic 
to Japan increasing its military expenditures. However, between 1981 and 1982 
China began to pursue a more independent foreign policy as it perceived that the 
United States was recovering military ground.^ ^ Then in 1983 Beijing became 
concerned over the implications of worsening relations with the United States and 
began to shift its policy back to a more pro-West, pro-Japan stance.^^ 
A communique had been issued in 1972 between then Japanese Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai as the basis for the Peace 
and Friendship Treaty (PFT) between the two countries. The communique promised 
a treaty of peace and friendship would be reached, but due to China's insistence on 
an "antj-hegemony" clause (which would have implied that Japan was forming an 
alliance, or "united front" with China against the USSR) no such treaty could be 
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concluded at the time.^^ By 1978，however, the political environments in both 
China and Japan had changed significantly enough that the treaty seemed viable. 
By that year, China had a much more pragmatic and stable leadership-Mao Zedong 
had died in 1976, and in August 1977 Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated during the 
Eleventh Congress of the CCP. In Japan, Sonoda Sunao had recently been 
appointed prime minister and was very enthusiastic about the P F T , 
At the same time, there was increasing pressure from the Keidanran for a fast 
conclusion of a treaty as prospects for trade with China looked increasingly bright.^^ 
Further pressure came from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) which supported the 
treaty with the anti-hegemony clause.?�In light of these domestic elements, the 
treaty was concluded in 1978 after being deliberated for the past six years. 
The signing of the treaty was hailed by the Japanese as an epoch-making 
moment in the history of Asia at large.”7i The response by the Chinese is summed 
up by Kim Hong-nack: 
For their part, the Chinese were also jubilant about the new treaty 
which symbolized a Chinese victory over the Russians in their bitter 
rivalry to court industrially advanced and powerful Japan. It was the 
first major treaty concluded by Beijing containing an anti-hegemony 
clause, a diplomatic code word against Soviet expansionismJ^ 
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In the period immediately following the signing of the peace treaty, 
conservative interests in Japan were relieved with the moderation of the post-Mao 
leadership toward the Japanese-American alliance as well as Japan's self-defense 
forces. Beijing's decision not to renew the Sino-Soviet alliance pact of 1950 
containing an anti-Japanese clause was another welcome development for Tokyo^^ 
Kim continues saying: 
Even more gratifying to the Japanese was that the Chinese 
concluded numerous contracts with the Japanese firms relating to 
virtually every aspect of China's four modernizations program, adopted 
in the spring of 1978 by the post-Mao leadership for the purpose of 
transforming China into a "powerful modern socialist country by the 
end of this century. ”？斗 
To better understand the motivations behind the two parties signing of the 
PFT, it would serve to look at their perspectives of the changing global balance of 
power at the time. 
Chinese Perceptions. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, China became increasingly concerned about a 
shift in the power balance in Asia. The USSR seemed to be commanding more 
influence in the region while the U.S. presence was declining noticeably. In August 
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1969，China began six months of military conflict with the USSR over national 
boundaries.75 By 1975 the US-supported governments in Indochina had collapsed, 
and by 1978 the USSR had gained substantially in the Third World-most notably 
Vietnam. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the close of 1979 further 
highlighted growing Soviet aggression. At the same time, US President Jimmy 
Carter sought to fulfill his campaign pledge of withdrawing U.S. troops from South 
Korea. These developments caused China to feel more vulnerable vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. 
During the same period, China's relations with Vietnam deteriorated. In 
spring of 1978 Deng Xiaoping openly criticized USSR-Vietnamese relations and 
accused Vietnam of mistreating overseas Chinese. On 28 June of that year, Vietnam 
asked to join the Soviet economic organization and in July China ended all economic 
and technical assistance to Vietnam. Some talks were held in August in an attempt 
to patch up the relationship, but these ended in failure in S e p t emb e r?� 
With the new threats to security, China was trapped in a paradoxical situation. 
Both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were determined that China embark on a 
course of modernization, yet by the end of 1977 41.5 percent of the state budget was 
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going to the military thereby undermining the desire to allocate sufficient economic 
resources to the development of domestic industries?? The only seeming way out 
of this quagmire was to get NATO, Japan and the United States to actively resist 
Soviet expansion.78 Thus, China hoped to use its new "friendship" with Japan to 
encourage the Japanese to increase their military expenditures. 
The following two passages illustrate the shift in China's view of Japanese 
rearmament during this period. The first quote is Okita Saburo's reflections on a 
visit to China in 1972, and the second describes the dismay of the Japanese Socialist 
Party over Chinese views in 1978. 
1) I was interested to note that all their (the Chinese) questions 
reflected a basic uneasiness that the rapid expansion of the Japanese 
economy might lead to a military build-up, and I was unable to 
reassure them that the Japanese people were no longer interested in 
military expansion because the old pre-war attitudes had changed and, 
more to the point, because Japan was now heavily dependent on 
global rather than regional sources of supply for a large proportion of 
her food, energy, and raw materials. The Chinese still seemed to be 
worried. Senator Scott, an American senator who was visiting at the 
time, mentioned to me on a later occasion that Zhou Enlai himself 
had expressed similar feelings of apprehension about a future military 
build-up by JapanJ^ 
2) Historical legacies had made a reversal of Chinese attitudes 
towards a Japanese military build-up likely. So when a turnabout 
occurred, it caused considerable surprise in Japan. The JSP in 
particular was dismayed by China's reversal on the defense question. 
A JSP delegation in March 1978 found severe divergence in their own 
and Chinese views. The Chinese urged Japan to build up its defense 
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power，and did not think it necessary for one country, the United 
States to defend another. The socialists claimed that stronger self-
defense would result in Japanese remilitarization. Under the security 
treaty with the United States the socialists argued, Japan became an 
American support base. The Chinese rejected the JSP positions, and 
pointed to the necessity of resisting the Soviet menace.如 
In the span of just six years, the change in views of the Chinese leadership in 
regard to Japanese defense was dramatic.^^ Clearly in 1978, China was ready and 
eager to conclude the PFT. 
Japanese Perceptions. 
One of the main obstacles to concluding the PFT had been over the anti-
hegemony clause that China had insisted upon. This clause will be discussed in 
more details later, but for now it suffices to say that Japan was hesitant to have a 
clause in the treaty that stated that she was opposed to Soviet hegemonism; this was 
likely to be interpreted by the Soviet Union (and by China) as Japan aligning against 
the USSR. For Japan to join the anti-Soviet alliance would likely provoke the 
Soviets and make Japan's own security that much more vulnerable. 
But in 1978，Japan decided to compromise on the anti-hegemony clause. Part 
of the motivation for doing so may have been fear of the United States 
"disengagement" from Asia. U.S. President Carter's foreign policy may have been 
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interpreted by the Japanese as "a Europe-first" policy in which case Japan would 
either have to build up its military strength in the face of strong domestic opposition 
or try to make new diplomatic initiatives.^^ 
Another incentive for Japan to conclude the PFT was the so-called "China 
market." Because of China's enormity in both land and population density, 
businessmen fantasized about the profit potential there. By 1978, with a more 
pragmatic leadership in China, the Japanese were particularly anxious to tap the 
China market (including its oil and labor) before the Americans did^ 
The anti-hegemony clause was the greatest obstacle to the Japanese signing 
the treaty. Japan was very concerned, as mentioned above, about Soviet 
interpretations of the treaty, and became alarmed when USSR criticisms of the PFT 
became more shrill. In addition, Japan may have been hesitant to risk losing out on 
Siberian development projects because of the treaty with China." 
The compromise that China and Japan finally achieved was to include the 
anti-hegemony clause (Article II)，but also to include Article IV stating that the 
treaty would not affect Japan's relations with countries other than China.®; While 
Article IV made Japan feel more confident about the treaty, China, the United 
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States, and probably the USSR all interpreted the treaty as a defacto alliance against 
the USSR.86 
Another obstacle to concluding the PFT was a territorial dispute between 
Japan, the PRC and Taiwan over the Senkaku (or Diaoyutai in Chinese) Islands. 
In April 1978，Japan noticed several armed PRC fishing boats in the vicinity of the 
islands and became concerned that this might be a challenge to Japan's claim over 
the territory, China assured Japan it was all a mistake and both countries agreed 
to leave the dispute for future generations to settle. Some speculate that the fishing 
boats may have been mobilized by a group opposed to the Deng-Hua clique in order 
to disrupt the negotiations, and if this was the case, the scheme ultimately failed.^^ 
In many ways, Japan's fear of the Soviet reaction to the PFT and the anti-
hegemony clause was justified. Even with Article IV of the treaty, which was meant 
to assure the USSR that Japan's relations with the Soviet Union would not be 
affected by the PFT, the Soviet response was swift and immediate. In the late spring 
of 1978，before the PFT was even signed, the Soviets began to increase their military 
presence in the Northern Territories (a region claimed by the Japanese) and 
particularly around the island of Etorofu. At that time, Japan must have considered 
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the greatly diminished chances of ever getting its territories back with a certain 
degree of dismay，Then, only one month after the treaty was ratified, the USSR 
and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship, which while reflecting the deterioration 
in Sino-Vietnamese relations, may have also been a Soviet countermove to the PFT. 
Japan's fear of how China might interpret the treaty also seems to have been 
justified in the short term. The treaty was signed on 12 August, and by the 15th, the 
People's Daily was claiming that the treaty was a "victory over Soviet 
hegemonism.”9o Deng Xiaoping also seemed to go out of his way to bring attention 
to the anti-hegemony clause and to encourage Japan to increase her military 
expenditures: 
Deng Xiaoping, in an interview a few weeks after the treaty, again 
encouraged Japan to increase its defense power. Sonoda stressed the 
anti-militarist intention of the treaty, but Beijing was giving an 
opposite meaning--that the closer relationship allowed the PRC to 
speak more frankly and directly on Japan's security affairs^i 
The negative consequences of the PFT were overshadowed by the economic 
consequences. The treaty paved the way for close economic cooperation between 
China and Japan as was indicated by a US$2 billion loan that was issued to China 
for coal and oil development shortly after the signing of the treaty. 
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Japan continued to try to maintain a neutral stance between the PRC and 
USSR during 1979，but the USSR must have seemed increasingly threatening in 
Japanese eyes. In a September speech, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
stated in Brussels that an American president would not launch an ICBM attack to 
save Europe; this may have diminished any notion the Japanese may have had about 
being under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And the Christmas 
invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops made the Russian threat all the more 
credible.92 When Director Yamashita of Japan's Defense Agency (JDA), held talks 
with Chinese Defense Minister Su Yu in May, the two officials seemed to share a 
deep concern over the strengthening of the Soviet forces in East Asia and the 
Russian use of Vietnamese ports and bases.^ ^ 
While Chinese and Japanese perceptions of their security relationship may 
have seemed more compatible in 1979 than in 1978, Japan still struggled to distance 
itself from the Chinese interpretation of the anti-hegemony clause. In particular, 
Japan became concerned when in February, the PRC attacked Vietnam "to teach it 
a lesson." During December 1978 and January of the following year, Vietnam 
launched an invasion into Cambodia and China felt it must respond with a show of 
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force. China's attack did not escalate into a prolonged battle, but many in Japan 
were worried at the time that China was acting with new boldness in the wake of the 
PFT--perhaps assuming they could get away with it because they had a defacto 
alliance with Japan. 
Well into the first year of the new era of Sino-Japanese relations, a pattern 
had already begun to emerge--at varying times within the coining decade, the two 
countries' economic and security interests would converge and diverge-sometimes 
wildly on the caprices of domestic issues. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Effects of Domestic Politics 
and Internal Competition for Power 
IV. Effects of Domestic Politics and Internal Competition for Power 
Domestic politics in both China and Japan play a very important role in Sino-
Japanese relations. In Japan, economic policies toward China can be determined 
to a high degree by the competition of interests among various industries. For 
example, Japanese oil refineries were forced to buy Chinese oil so that the steel 
industry could increase its exports to the PRC. And likewise, Japan is limited in its 
ability to buy cheap Chinese coal because of pressure from the Japanese coal 
companies to buy domestically. 
China's relations with Japan have also been constrained because of the 
domestic political implications of being too open to the Japanese. As a result, Japan 
has often been used as a scapegoat for domestic troubles. For example, what his 
critics regarded as overly enthusiastic overtures to Japan partially attributed to the 
downfall of Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor-General Secretary Hu Yaobang. 
Even more problematic to Sino-Japanese relations have been the dramatic 
changes in Chinese economic policy due to the power shifts among the PRC ruling 
elite as demonstrated in the Baoshan Steel Mill project debacle (explained in Section 
II above, "Differing Economic Expectations")-once Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun 
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became more influential, millions of dollars worth of Japanese contracts were 
threatened or even cancelled with the shift in economic policy away from 
emphasizing the development of heavy industry to one of developing light industry. 
Another example of how internal politics play a role in the bilateral 
relationship can be seen in 1985. During that year China's severe economic 
problems lead to discontented Chinese students protesting against what they saw as 
"Japanese economic aggression" against their country. However, what at the outset 
may have been directed against the Japanese was in reality largely directed against 
Deng Xiaoping and his open-door policy. The rising prices of consumer goods and 
the flooding of the market with competitive quality Japanese imports were the by-
products of Deng's policies. Also at issue in the anti-Japanese protests was the 
domestic corruption which could be linked to the government and Deng Xiaoping.94 
But just as the anti-Japanese sentiment dispersed, so too did many challenges to 
Deng Xiaoping and his agenda. By December of 1985 he seemed to be firmly in 
control again and ready to go forward with his policies. 
‘ The question of succession to Deng was queried since his candidate Hu 
Yaobang was ousted in January 1987 following his lenient handling of student 
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demonstrations for democracy. On the heals of Hu's fall from power came a 
campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" which attacked Hu's polices as being 
overly capitalistic, and which was aimed at persuading students to give up their 
demands for democracy and follow the correct party line. Hu's overtures to Japan, 
including an invitation to 3,000 Japanese students to China and an invitation to 
Prime Minister Nakasone were partially responsible for his downfall.^ ^ 
The internal power play in China was evident with Peng Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, 
and Deng Liqun actively including criticisms of Japan in the bourgeois liberalization 
campaign. Deng Xiaoping, who may have felt his open-door policy challenged by 
the criticisms of his rivals, seemed anxious to control the campaign by participating 
in it and leading it; he too had some harsh comments on Japan.^^ 
However, by July 1987, Deng seemed anxious to prevent relations with Japan 
from deteriorating further. The 50th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident 
(a Japanese conspired incident responsible for the start of the second Sino-Japanese 
war) was held on 14 July of that year, and would have provided an excellent 
opportunity to give Japan a verbal lashing. But Deng was very conciliatory and 
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expressed his hopes for a long-term friendship with Japan. Hu Qiaomu, on the other 
hand, perhaps in a further challenge to Deng and his policies, did not refrain from 
making some anti-Japanese remarks at the time.^ ^ 
By the end of 1987, the domestic political scene in China quieted with the 
conclusion of a very successful 13th Party Congress in which Zhao Ziyang, Deng's 
new heir apparent, made a confident two-and-a-half hour speech supporting 
economic reforms, the implementation of certain capitalistic principles, and the 
open-door policy. While Zhao would replace Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of 
the CCP, Li Peng replaced Zhao as premier. 
The rise of Zhao Ziyang certainly seemed to bode well for the future of Sino-
Japanese relations. Zhao appeared firmly committed to reforming the economy and 
the bureaucracy. He was particularly anxious to separate the Party and the 
government, and implement a civil service system that recruited on the basis of 
examinations. If he had been successful, his reforms would have contributed greatly 
to a stronger Chinese economy and to a better investment climate in the PRC. In 
the wake of the Party Congress, Zhao's support seemed to be broad, but after his 
pre-4 June 1989 visit to the protesting students at Tiananmen Square, Zhao and his 
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supporters vanished from the political scene. Like is predecessor Hu Yaobang, 
whose inability to stay in power was partially attributed to his lack of friends in the 
military, it seemed that Zhao faced a similar problem， 
Li Peng's rise to the position of premier was a positive development from the 
perspective of Sino-Japanese relations. Li, much more cautious than Zhao on 
economic and political reforms, is nonetheless a reformist and seems to desire a 
cooperative relationship with Japan. Furthermore, many believed that a cautious 
approach to economic development was precisely what the PRC needed at that time: 
Mr. Li's caution may be particularly appropriate for China at present, 
diplomats in Beijing said. After several years of spectacular growth, 
China's economy is struggling. Prices are skyrocketing, corruption is 
rampant, and grain planners should move in the coming year to solve 
such problems before further reforms can be introduced.^^ 
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CHAPTER V 
The Dichotomy of Commonality 
Versus a Histoiy of Hatred 
V. The Dichotomy of Commonality Versus a History of Hatred 
On 18 September 1931，Japan invaded China and for the next thirteen years 
occupied Manchuria, carrying out cruel military campaigns against the Chinese 
people. Memories of the war with Japan remain vivid and bitter. This theme no 
doubt is the one that underlies much of present day Sino-Japanese relations as the 
concept of renewed Japanese militarism is an emotional issue to both countries. 
During the first half of 1980，Japan continued to be very sensitive about 
Chinese encouragements to build up Japanese defense forces in light of perceived 
Soviet growth in the region (as stated in Section III，"Changing Global Balance of 
Power)." When Hua Guofeng visited Japan in May of 1980, Japanese Prime 
Minister Ohira requested that he refrain from making any statements on defense 
issues that might be damaging to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the 
upcoming election. 1�° Despite these precautions, Ohira was embarrassed anyway 
by General Wu Xiuquan, who in May took it upon himself to comment on the merits 
of the Japan-US security treaty. His comments were sufficiently irritating to the 
Japanese that Okita Saburo sharply criticized Wu's statement in a Diet committee 
hearing: 
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After the war, Japan has intentionally pledged that it will not walk the 
path leading to becoming a military big power. It has also taken the 
basic position that it will have defense power within necessary bounds, 
and that it will realize nuclear deterrent on the strength of the Japan-
US security treaty. To make a rash statement, without understanding 
the situation in Japan, the people's sentiments, and circumstances in 
Japan after the war, is a kind of intervention in domestic affairs.皿 
Public sentiments in Japan underwent a great change in the second half of 
1980. Due to the unexpected and tragic death of Prime Minister Ohira during the 
election campaigns, the LDP suddenly found itself with a much stronger public 
mandate based on sentiments over Ohira's death.^ ^^ Furthermore, with the 
discovery of a Soviet submarine in Japanese waters in September, Japan became 
much more receptive to the idea of protecting itself against the possibility of a Soviet 
attack.103 As a result, the new prime minister, Suzuki Zenko, was able to be much 
more assertive on promoting defense than his predecessors. In July, he visited 
Yasukuni Shrine, a war memorial which honors several prominent Japanese war 
criminals. Although Suzuki's visit was technically not an "official" visit, such an 
action done in politically sensitive times could be interpreted by China as a sign of 
remilitarization in Japan (as would be the case with Prime Minister Nakasone's visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine five years later in 1985). But criticism for Suzuki's visit 
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seems to have been limited to domestic criticism. Suzuki was also able to define for 
the Japanese defense forces a role much broader in scope than they previously had. 
Another sensitive issue surrounding Japan's militarism is the textbook issue. 
In June 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Education issued revised high school 
textbooks which downplayed Japanese atrocities and aggression in China before and 
during World War II. Words like "invasion" were replaced with "advance," and in 
regard to the 1937 "Rape of Nanking," Japan implied that "heavy Chinese resistance" 
may have provoked the incident.— 
The Chinese were incensed and voiced their objections in numerous editorials 
and through the publication of gruesome photographs of Japanese wartime atrocities. 
On 26 July a formal protest was lodged with Japan, demanding that Japan correct 
the distortions of its past aggression against China. Six days later, the Chinese 
government withdrew an invitation for Japanese Education Minister Heiji Ogawa to 
visit the and threatened to cancel a planned visit by Prime Minister Suzuki 
Zenko， 
Education Minister Ogawa first responded to the Chinese protests by saying 
that China would understand Japan's true intentions of revising the textbooks once the 
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Japanese government had given a full explanation. He said, "There had been no 
change in Japan's repentance for inflicting extensive damage on China," and that his 
government was "not considering any revival of militarism." Despite these assurances, 
Ogawa "indicated his ministry would not reverse the textbook revisions" and claimed 
that "the textbooks make it clear that Japan initiated the war in China and that they 
also include the purport of the Japan-China joint communique."^^^ 
Beijing rejected Ogawa's assurances and Japan was forced to send several top 
officials to China to try to reach a solution. But on August 30th the Chinese were still 
dissatisfied with Japanese explanations and solutions on the issue. Finally, Japan 
came up with a plan that was acceptable to China. The textbooks would be revised 
within two years, and in the meantime supplementary guidelines would be provided 
with the disputed texts. 
The resolution reached in the last days of August immediately cleared the way 
for friendly relations. In September 1982 Prime Minister Suzuki visited Beijing and 
issued assurances that Japan would never become a military power again, and Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian stated that there was no disagreement between China 
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and Japan on Japanese military policy.:�8 But in retrospect, these three months in 
1982 marked a turning point in Chinese views of Japan's strategic role in the Far East. 
No longer would China pursue a policy of encouraging Japanese defense expenditures. 
Instead, China moved toward a more independent foreign policy, and moved away 
from the notion of a global united front with the United States, Japan, and Western 
Europe. • This policy decision would be reinforced with the election and 
subsequent actions of succeeding Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. 
Nakasone, a former director-general of the Japanese Defense Agency, was 
much more outspoken on promoting Japan's defense capabilities in his role as prime 
minister than any of his predecessors during their tenures. But during Hu Yaobang's 
visit to Japan in November 1983，both Nakasone and Hu seemed anxious to give an 
impression of harmony on defense issues. Nakasone said that Japan would adhere to 
the present constitution which forbade a Japanese return to militarism, and that all 
military expenditures would be limited to defense purposes. "Hu responded that 
China was confident that Japan would never invade China, even if Japan's capability 
were expanded.”• Thus, despite China's recent apprehension over Japan's defense 
policy, progress was made in the relationship, especially in new economic cooperation 
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projects. (However, during this seemingly optimistic period, China began to incur a 
huge trade deficit with Japan, which would damage relations in the not so-distant 
future.) The period up until April 1984 seemed reminiscent of the period of 1978 to 
1980 with Japan abiding by its post-war peace policies and China hinting that an 
increase in Japan's defense capability might be appropriate. 
That prior Chinese concerns over an increase in Japanese military spending 
seemed to have diminished was further indicated by the general warmth of Hu 
Yaobang's visit to Japan. At this time, Hu invited 3,000 Japanese students to visit 
China and offered much praise of the Japanese nation. Blended in with his hopes for 
Japan, Hu again hinted on the importance of adequate Japanese defense: 
I am deeply aware that, owing to decades of industrious effort by your 
leaders and masses of people, your country ranks among the world's 
most developed nations in economy and technology. Your 
achievements speak volumes for the vigour and enterprising spirit of the 
Japanese nation. I sincerely hope that your people will keep up this 
enterprising spirit, pursue a correct foreign policy, and turn the country 
into an even more prosperous power devoted to the preservation of 
world peace while possessing self-defense capabilities.m 
Nakasone's visit to the PRC in March 1984 was equally cordial and was notable 
for the unprecedented nineteen-gun salute given in the prime minister's honor. The 
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level of defense cooperation between the two countries seemed to have reached new 
heights with Nakasone making numerous anti-Soviet comments and with Zhao Ziyang 
confirming China's position that the USSR posed the greatest security threat to the 
PRC. An agreement to exchange intelligence on Soviet military activities was even 
reached,ii2-_a turnabout from Japan's cautiousness in prior years of avoiding giving 
the Soviet Union an impression of a Sino-Japanese alliance. In April, Japan began 
to provide assistance to Afghan refugees, a further anti-Soviet step. 
But by 1985, the feelings of cooperation and enthusiasm was already souring. 
China and Japan seemed worlds apart in their views of defense and economics-these 
differences were amplified by domestic politics in both countries and by the Chinese 
commemoration of the second Sino-Japanese war. 
Prime Minister Nakasone's desire to abolish the cdling on defense 
expenditures may have been met with support from China earlier, but in 1985 the 
political environment was different. Some Chinese officials had much less confidence 
in Japan's economic intentions given the growing trade deficit between the two in 
Japan's favor. A growing number were suspecting that Japan's trade policies were 
designed to exploit China. Fears of Moscow had also abated considerably since 1978， 
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and Chinese foreign policy toward a more independent stance was indicated by the 
visit of Soviet Vice-Premier Ivan Arkhipov to the PRC in December 1984 and the 
trade agreement that was reached between the two countries. These factors, 
combined with severe domestic economic problems for the Chinese, made for a 
climate in China well-suited for anti-Japanese sentiment. How unfortunate that it 
should be at a this time that Nakasone should announce his intention to abolish the 
ceiling on Japanese defense spending. 
Nakasone made his announcement in July 1985，but he was met with such 
strong domestic opposition that he was forced to back down from his position by 
September.113 Nonetheless, Nakasone's efforts to increase military spending beyond 
the symbolic one percent of the GNP must have been received by many in China as 
an indication of Japanese hawkishness. What made Japan's image even worse, 
however, was Nakasone's insistence on making an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine 
in August with members of his cabinet. As mentioned earlier, a visit to the shrine by 
his predecessor Suzuki was in an unofficial capacity. Nakasone's visit to the shrine 
that honors several prominent Japanese war criminals was perceived by Chinese 
students as an indication that Japan was planning to remilitarize.ii4 The Chinese 
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government's official mouthpiece, the Xinhua News Agency issued this angry 
commentary: 
Like those of many other Asian countries, the Chinese people and 
government have cherished the hope that the Japanese government will 
bow to historical facts and take an unequivocal stand on the appalling 
war of aggression and on where the guilt and responsibility lie. This is 
the best guarantee against the renewal of militarism and the recurrence 
of any such crime. 
To their deepest disappointment and regret, the Japanese government 
decided, for the first time since the end of the war, to pay an official 
visit to the shrine. It openly declared that "the purpose of the visit is to 
honor the memory of those who gave their precious lives to the defence 
of their motherland and their fellow countrymen." Then, as if on 
second thought, it said that it "is deeply aware of the tremendous 
suffering and damage inflicted on other people, first and foremost, other 
Asian peoples." 
These conflicting statements impress one with the intention to obscure 
more or less the wicked nature of the war of aggression unleashed by 
the Japanese militarists-an intention that makes a mockery of the 
sentiments and aspirations of the Chinese and other Asian peoples.^^^ 
On 18 September 1985，fifty-four years after Japan's invasion of China, one 
thousand Chinese students staged demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to 
protest what they perceived to be Japan's economic aggression and remilitarization. 
Soon demonstrations flared up in other cities, like Xian and Chengdu.^ ^^ 
An interesting dimension of the demonstrations was a letter that was probably 
forged by Beijing University students. The letter was made up so as to appear as to 
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have been written by a Japanese "economic warrior," who was predicting that Japan 
would once again invade the "economically inferior" country of China. Although the 
letter did not seem to have been accorded much credence from university faculty or 
the Foreign Affairs Office, the fact that the letter was able to arouse such a great deal 
of anger among the students indicates the degree of almost xenophobic anger that was 
commonly felt toward the Japanese at this time.i^ 
In response to the protests, the government tried to convince the students that 
the open-door policy and economic cooperation with Japan was essential for China's 
modernization. To help persuade the students to channel their energies toward 
modernization, the government mobilized high-ranking veterans of the Anti-Japanese 
Resistance Movement to argue the government's cause.us 
Perhaps due to the effectiveness of the government's approach, or perhaps due 
to the exaggeration of the students' fears of Japan, the wave of anti-Japanese 
sentiment crested and disappeared. By December, students seemed to be interested 
in Japanese actors and actresses again, "and by Lunar New Year, the coveted 
Japanese products such as a Toshiba fridge and 脚 type of Japanese color TV were 
advertised and sold out in almost all the department stores."^ ^^ 
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The period covering mid-1986 to mid-June 1989 were difficult ones in the Sino-
Japanese relationship. This was due in part to the volatility of China's domestic 
scene-the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, an anti-corruption campaign, the 
fall of Hu Yaobang, questions over the succession of power after Deng Xiaoping's 
death，the 50th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and the Tiananmen 
Square incident have all provided opportunities for anti-Japanese sentiments to rise 
and be expressed. Perhaps it is not strange that Japanese residents and tourists were 
put under a "death sentence" by Chinese "underground" fighters after the 4 June 
massacre. Furthermore, developments in Japan's military spending policy as well as 
its Taiwan policy caused considerable anger in the PRC. In terms of economic 
relations, progress was made in reducing China's trade deficit with Japan, but to 
Beijing's frustration, this was not accomplished through increased Japanese purchases 
of Chinese goods. Only strict Chinese import controls of Japanese consumer products 
prevented the further decay of China's foreign exchange reserves. To make matters 
worse, China had been unsuccessful in wooing more Japanese investment into China, 
despite having implemented more attractive investment provisions. Japan seemed to 
be greatly disillusioned by its investment experiences in the PRC. However, despite 
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these setbacks, goodwill and the desire for a closer relationship remained prevalent 
on both sides. 
Perhaps the one Japanese domestic political development that cast a shadow 
over the bilateral relationship was the issue of increased defense spending. In January 
1987，Nakasone was finally successful in having the symbolic one percent of GNP 
ceiling on defense spending scrapped. Although, as mentioned previously, China had 
encouraged Japan to increase such spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chinese 
attitudes had shifted considerably since Nakasone's election and the abandonment of 
the one percent ceiling was not met with enthusiasm in China. The following analysis 
appeared in the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily�explaining the official Chinese view: 
According to historical experience and present conditions, Japan's 
defense strength should be for self-defense purposes and be kept at a 
minimum level, and must not exceed the limits of self-defense or grow 
out of control. Japan made such a promise and pledge to the whole 
world after World War II. At present, as compared with other major 
developed countries in the world, Japan's defense spending still 
accounts for a small proportion of the country's GNP, but due to 
Japan's advanced economy, the absolute amount of one percent of the 
GNP is a rather considerable figure. Take this year as an example. It 
is expected that Japan's GNP may reach US$2,400 billion. This means 
that one percent of its GNP is a huge amount of US$24 billion. This 
is quite enough for Japan, which has repeatedly claimed to be a "state 
of peace." How could it be necessary to increase defense spending? 
People may say that the difference between one percent and the new 
percentage is very slight. However, this reflects a substantial change in 
a certain sense. The change can be summarized in one word-the 
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"break.” Given the first "break，” it is unavoidable that the second and 
the third "break" and more "breaks" will follow, and the state of affairs 
will get out of control.120 
This concern over Japanese military spending had been a prevalent theme 
during 1988 and 1989，and has been linked to a broad array of issues ranging from 
Japanese policies toward Taiwan to Japanese economic policies. The Chinese are not 
alone in their worries, however. Writers from America and England had also been 
fretting about the renewal of Japanese nationalism and whether Japan will 
remilitarize. These worries had been fostered by the irresponsible (and sometimes 
severely offensive) comments of Prime Minister Nakasone and members of his cabinet 
at a time when Britain, China, and the United States were all upset over Japanese 
trade practices and growing trade deficits with Japan. 
The first issue of contention between China and Japan vis-a-vis Taiwan during 
the period now under discussion was in January 1987 when Japan turned over to 
Taiwan a North Korean family seeking asylum in Taiwan. The PRC felt that this 
action was a violation of Japan's pledge not to have dealings with the Taiwanese 
government.121 Following soon after this incident was the dormitory issue. 
In February 1987，an Osaka court overturned a 1977 ruling granting the 
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ownership of the Kokario dormitory in Kyoto initially to the PRC—the PRC and 
Taiwan had battled for ownership for 20 years prior to the 1977 ruling. Taiwan build 
the dormitory in 1952 with money that the PRC claimed belonged to them. Not only 
was Beijing angered by the new ruling of February 1987，it strongly objected to the 
principle of letting the Taiwanese into Japanese courts in the first place. Beijing 
claimed this action violated a 1972 agreement that Japan signed with the PRC 
prohibiting government-level relations between Japan and Taiwan.^ ^^ On 4 May, 
two weeks after having warned Japan to decrease its trade surplus with China and not 
revert to the path of militarism, Deng Xiaoping tried to persuade Tokyo to change its 
position on the dormitory issue.^ ^^ Deng even went so far as to say, "That the 
Japanese government's refusal to take China's side...pointed to a rebirth of Japanese 
militarism..."i24 Japan refused to interfere politically with its courts, perhaps leaving 
China with the impression that Japan was now embarking on a more independent 
policy-economically, strategically, and vis-a-vis the two Chinas. 
Japan in turn became so irritated by China's allegations of renewed militarism 
that the Japanese Foreign Ministry reprimanded the Chinese ambassador to Japan 
over this incident. Shortly thereafter, Henmi Shuitsu, a journalist working for the 
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Japanese news agency Kyodo in Beijing, was accused by China of stealing national 
intelligence documents. Henmi was threatened with arrest if he did not leave China 
within ten days.^ ^^  It is strongly suspected that Henmi's expulsion had little to do 
with the allegations, and a lot to do with China's general frustration over Japanese 
policies. To make matters worse, a Japanese vice-foreign minister made a comment 
in June that Deng Xiaoping was living up in the clouds. The response of the Chinese 
government was extremely angry and the Japanese official was forced to resign and 
apologize for the remark.^^^ 
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CHAPTER VI 
Current Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations 
VI. Current Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations 
Emperor Akihito^s China Visit. 
29 September 1992 marks the 20th anniversary of normalization of bilateral 
diplomatic ties between China and Japan. To celebrate the special occasion, Japanese 
Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko will visit Beijing, Xian, and Shanghai on 23-28 
October. This year has been marked by a series of political, economic and cultural 
exchanges between the two countries as a lead up to the historical first-ever visit by 
a Japanese emperor to China. Beijing first issued the invitation to Emperor Akihito 
three years ago when Chinese Premier Li Peng was visiting Tokyo in April 1989，but 
the invitation was put on hold after Tiananmen.^^^ The invitation was renewed 
when Chinese CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan during 6-10 April 
of this y e a r ， 
The deluge of exchanges, aimed at promoting the development of continued 
friendly cooperative relations between China and Japan, included the eight-day visit 
by Wan Li, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(NPC) to Japan 25 May to 1 June. The visit, extended at the invitation of the leaders 
of the two houses of the Diet (Japanese parliament), comprised of Wan's meetings 
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with Emperor Akihito, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, Foreign Minister Michio 
Watanabe, and leaders of both houses of the parliament along with business leaders 
and officials from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and opposition 
parties.129 The previous month, as mentioned above, Chinese CCP General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin met with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in Tokyo-Jiang was the most 
senior Chinese leader to visit Japan since the Tiananmen Square incident.^^^ 
Other exchanges as part of celebrations marking the 20th anniversary include: 
former Japanese prime minister Toshiki Kaifu meeting with Chinese Premier Li Peng 
in Beijing (Kaifu was accompanied by a delegation from Tokyo Shimhun；):^ ^^  
Secretary Xie Fei of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP on an official 
goodwill visit to Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in June;^ ^^ 
a delegation from the travel industry committee of the Japanese Association for the 
Promotion of International Trade headed by chairman Takeshi Otani was met by 
Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian-the aim was to promote the development of 
travel between the two countries^ a delegation headed by Hiroshi Saito, president 
of the Nippon Steel Corporation met with Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji in 
Beijing;i斜 Wu Yi, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and 
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Trade (Mofert), headed a delegation to Japan to attend the second session of the 
China-Japan Trade Promotion Committee aimed at promoting Japanese investment 
in China and Japanese government loans to the country;^ ^^ Sung Pinghua, president 
of the China-Japan Friendship Association met with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa on 19 June as part of a 13-day visit to Japan which began on 9 June;^ ^^ 
and former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka visited China for five days at the end of 
August”？ 
The upcoming Japanese emperor's visit has been a very delicate issue in both 
China and Japan. In Japan, the monarch's visit was met with opposition by 
ultranationalists both in the Diet, the ruling LDP, and in the general population. The 
Japanese are sensitive about involving the emperor in political affairs, especially 
affairs that are as sensitive as Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s， The Japanese are 
particularly concerned about the speech that Emperor Akihito will make during his 
visit: 
...the emperor's speech will decide the nature of the planned trip. The 
government does not intend to make a clear apology for World War II. 
However, because of complicated factors, such as the motives of the 
Chinese, the need for the government to take into account the opinion 
of Japanese groups opposed to the visit, and the need to implement 
well balanced diplomacy toward other nations, the government is likely 
to have difficulty coordinating various opinions to the last. 
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Any "speech" that the emperor makes in a foreign country is "considered 
an official one and is nothing more than a courtesy speech" (according 
to a government source)…Even so, the government seems to want to use 
the emperor's visit as an opportunity to refer to World War 11. 
…Meanwhile, the government said: "On such an occasion as a 
welcoming party, the emperor may refer to the past. But we should not 
impose a specific burden on the emperor" (according to Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Koichi Kato). In this way, the government has indicated its 
intention to avoid a clear apology. The prevailing view within the 
government is that the Chinese side will not take a firm attitude 
concerning the issue of the emperor's speech.^ ^^ 
Because of the importance of the speech to the visit, great care is being given 
it: 1) the Japanese Foreign Ministry will draw up a draft speech based on 
negotiations with China, 2) the draft will then be reviewed by the Imperial Household 
Agency and the Foreign Ministry will hear the opinion of intellectuals, 3) Prime 
Minister Miyazawa will approve the draft, and 4) the emperor will give final 
approval.140 The Foreign Ministry will examine the emperor's past speeches for 
references in drawing up the draft: 
When the ministry draws it up, it will have to take into account the 
points the emperor conveyed to South Korean President Roh Tae Woo 
during his visit to Japan in 1990. At the time, the emperor said: "We 
cannot help expressing deep regret [for the unfortunate past]." The 
government does not intend to make a clearer reference to the past in 
the emperor's speech to be delivered to the Chinese side. A 
government source said: "If the emperor should say more about the 
past in China, it would be unfair to South Korea in terms of well-
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balanced diplomacy...''^ 
And during his visit in April, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin told Prime 
Minister Miyazawa that no "unreasonable demands" would be attached to the state 
visit-meaning that China would not expect the Japanese emperor to apologise for 
occupying China.i42 
The trip is seen by the Japanese as a step towards a long-term working 
relationship between the two countries. The Japanese foreign ministry seems to be 
more interested in forward-looking aspects of the trip—丨丨we need to establish a shared 
perspective with China about the future of Asia…To do that, we must first do 
something about the historical past," explained a foreign ministry o f f i c i a l，Th a t 
is, the Japanese government hopes the visit will "set the seal on Sino-Japanese 
reconciliation half a century after the end of Japanese military occupation of Chinese 
territory.i"^ 
Public opinion in Japan seems to support Akihito's visit to China. Three out 
of four Japanese approve of Emperor Akihito's visit to China, but distrust of Beijing 
is growing, according to a poll published by the Yomiuri Shimbun on 13 September 
1992.145 The Chinese government views the trip as evidence that Sino-Japanese 
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relations have completely returned to normal. Since under the Japanese constitution 
the emperor symbolizes the state and unity of the people, his visit will mark a 
qualitative improvement in bilateral relations^^^-even more important at a time 
when Sino-American relations are at a low point. 
However, sensitivity over past aggression remains evident with several sticky 
issues: the renewed demand for war reparations including the request for the return 
of stolen national treasures taken during over the war years and compensation for 
"comfort women"--Chinese and other Asian women forced into prostitution to service 
Japanese troops during World War II，and the unresolved sovereignty claims over the 
Senkaku (or Diaoyutai) Islands. 
In March 1992 the Chinese National People's Congress was presented with a 
bill demanding the Japanese government pay US$180 billion to compensate war 
victims.147 However, in the 1972 joint communique establishing diplomatic relations 
with Japan, the Chinese dropped war reparation claims for damages inflicted during 
the war.148 One group consisting of members of China's legal circles have initiated 
a nongovernmental drive demanding war reparations from Japan--they plan to suggest 
to the Japanese during Emperor Akihito's visit that "he should furnish China with a 
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list of all valuable relics of the Japanese royal family which had been stolen from 
China during the Second World War and return them to China to signal a start in its 
war reparation payment to C h i n a � — Another group, consisting of three Chinese 
men，who survived a massacre of laborers at a mine in Japan during the war, 
demanded an apology and compensation of 5 million Yen for their suffering from the 
Kajima Corporation, one of Japan's top construction companies.^^^ 
The Japanese government formally acknowledged in an official report released 
in July 1992 that it played an official role in organizing frontline military brothels 
during World War II. The report, based on a six-month study of thousands of 
documents from six ministries and agencies, showed that the Japanese government was 
also involved in systematically recruiting women from Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia to provide sex to Japanese soldiers during the war.^ ^^  
Perhaps even more sensitive is the disputed Senkaku islands. Although Deng 
Xiaoping suggested the dispute be left to future generations, the recent Chinese 
proclamation of a new territorial law of sovereignty to the islands located between 
Japan and Taiwan has upset the Japanese—especially since large oil deposits are said 
to lie beneath the surrounding seas.^ ^^  
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Shifts in the Regional Power Balancp. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, with its accompanying withdrawal from the 
Asia-Pacific region, and the anticipated reduction of an American presence (e.g. 
withdrawal from Subic Bay and Clarke Air Force base in the Philippines) presents a 
power vacuum. Both in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions there is 
evidence of expanding arms races. While relatively little attention has been given to 
the risks of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region, in 1991 this region accounted for 
35 percent of all imports of major weapons, more than any other region including 
Europe.153 Japan finds itself under increased pressure from the United States 
to spend more on "burden sharing" in defense, and Americans also urge more 
Japanese purchases of U.S.-made weapons as a means of balancing the U.S. trade 
deficit with Japan. As a result, Japan remains second only to India as a major arms 
importer in the region-accounting for US$9,750 million in arms imports from 1987-
1991 154 The aforementioned power vacuum may well be that Japan takes up some 
of the slack from the Americans, and will thus remain a major arms importer in 
future.155 
China, on the other hand, while importing only US$797 million in arms during 
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the same period, exported US$2,000 million during 1989 compared to Japan's US$110 
million in arms exports that same y e a r , and remains the major arms exporter in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC accounts for 5.8 percent of the exports to nine 
states of the Asia-Pacific region-with sales to Pakistan and North Korea a cause for 
concern as destabilizing to the regional balance—and is the local power with the most 
powerful defense industry.^ ^^ Only two countries in East Asia ranked among the top 
15 exporters of major conventional arms to the developing world during the 1986-1990 
period-the PRC (ranked 4th) and North Korea (ranked 
In the post-Cold War era, both China and Japan have accordingly shifted their 
security focuses, and remain wary of the other's intentions. While China has been 
flexing its muscles in the South China Sea, the Japanese parliament has passed a 
controversial bill allowing Japanese soldiers to take part in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. 
In May 1992 China signed an agreement with a small American company to 
explore for oil and gas in a block contiguous to an offshore Vietnamese oil field and 
in an area close to the Spratly Islands.^ ^^ The area in question is claimed by 
Vietnam as belonging to its continental shelf. Although China stated the matter 
70 
would be discussed when Malaysia and Vietnam objected to the exploration 
agreement, China passed a law affirming claim to the islands stating its determination 
to defend them.i6o Almost all of Japan's oil imports pass through this vicinity, and 
Japan also has an interest in securing large portions of Vietnam's oil reserves-three 
Japanese companies are among five that Vietnam short-listed for the Big Bear oil 
field，once considered the most promising field in the South China Sea.^ ^^  
According to an article in Tokyo's Asahi Shimbun on 3 August 1992, China has 
been working on "military modernization" as a long-pending national policy and has 
actively been reinforcing naval forces since the late 1980s. Moreover, China's moves 
toward the Spratly Islands and their peripheral waters are creating a stir in Southeast 
A s i a， 
China has its own reasons for concern-after nearly two years of debate in the 
Japanese parliament, the Diet passed a law on 15 June 1992 allowing up to 1,800 
Japanese soldiers to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(PKO).i63 The first group of soldiers will head to Cambodia and take part in 
providing logistic and medical help-it will be the first time since 1945 that Japanese 
troops will go abroad for anything other than training exercises-Japan's post-war 
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constitution bans Japan from settling international disputes by military force. 
Although the PKO law prohibits troops from taking part in military action, more than 
1，000 hand guns and small arms will be made available to the Japanese PKO 
contingent being sent to Cambodia--they are mainly being sent to repair roads and 
build bridges—should their lives be threatened.^^ 
China's response to the passing of the PKO bill has been muted in light of the 
forthcoming visit by Emperor Akihito. Jiang Zemin in his visit in April signaled that 
the "Chinese government and people…support Japan in playing a positive role in 
defense of peace in Asia and the world and in promoting the economic prosperity of 
all countries;" he then hinted that China "would not directly oppose" the so-called 
peacekeeping bill.^ ^^ Wu Jianmin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman issued 
the following statement in June when the issue was being debated in the Diet lower 
house: 
The Chinese side "has always hoped that the Japanese Government will 
act with prudence on this matter. Due to historical reasons, Japan's 
sending troops abroad is a very sensitive issue."...The Japanese 
government "well knows the Chinese government's issue on this 
issue."i66 
Although official reaction has been restrained, in Reference Materials, a daily 
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news digest for senior cadres, while recommending that public comment should be 
muted in view of China's need for Japanese aid, the digest noted a shift in Japan's 
dealing with China from bilateral issues to a greater stress on broader-ranged issues 
such as arms sales and human rights-much more in line with American and European 
policies toward China. China is concerned with this shift-seen as Japan's move to 
become a more global actor-but economic factors are too important to make a public 
issue out of the PKO bill.^ ^^ Perhaps an earlier indication that China's old 
accusations are losing impact on Japan can be seen during Jiang Zemin's visit in 
April. When he reminded Japanese officials of past atrocities saying, "The Chinese 
people endured tremendous suffering from Japanese military aggression," in reference 
to Japanese sending troops abroad again, he was told that if China wanted better 
relations with Japan and the West, it should improve its human rights record•棚 
This switch to a more active international role for Japan is even more evident 
in the main objectives outlined by Ichiro Ozawa, acting chairman of the LDP 
Takeshita faction. Ozawa hopes to revise or reinterpret over the next three to five 
years the constitutional restraints on the use of the country's armed forces so that 
Japan can play a more active security role-including participation in collective security 
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arrangements such as the multinational task forces used in the US-led alliance against 
Iraq in the Gulf War.^ ^^ 
While Nakasone has been the most prominent among senior LDP leaders to 
promote a more active military role by increasing Japanese defense spending limits 
during his tenure as prime minister between 1982 and 1987, Ozawa in contrast has 
tried to distance himself from ultranational gestures like visiting the Yasukuni war 
shrine as Nakasone did in 1985. Ozawa set up and chaired the LDP's Special Study 
Group in 1991 on Japan's role in the international community. The group first 
drafted a report containing a detailed analysis of post-Cold War geopolitical changes 
in February 1992. The report called for re-interpreting Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution so that Japan "can cooperate in ways that include the use of force in 
overseas peacekeeping and peacemaking operations provided that this cooperation 
is part of international actions agreed to by the community of nations."^ '^ ^ 
Bilateral Cooperation. 
It can be said that Japanese policy towards China since rapprochement has 
been reactive rather than proactive. Japanese policy remains guided by the aim for 
friendly cooperative ties between the two major countries of Asia not only for the two 
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concerned, but for the peace and stability of Asia as well as the entire world.^ ^^ 
However, "the trade relationship is now of primary importance, and that will continue 
to be the case. It serves both countries' interests very much for the business ties to 
continue to grow，" according to Motofumi Asai, former head of the China desk at the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry.^ ^^ Japan cannot ignore China because China is a huge 
market…The key thing is that Japan wants China to be successful so it can sell more 
of its goods, but doesn't want China to be too successful because it could do without 
a big competitor next door."^ ^^ 
At the moment, China is the partner with the leverage. Today Tokyo invests 
on Beijing's terms, but Japan doesn't complain. "We have no leverage now" because 
for the moment Japan needs China at least as much as China needs Japan: "We 
could withdraw our loans, but we have too much at stake," concedes one government 
official.174 Some Japanese trading companies have been dealing with China since 
the early 1960s, well before the reopening of diplomatic ties—and well before most 
Western companies had any presence at all in China. The trend continues through 
today, with the bulk of Japan's post-war economic influx occurring since 1985 when 
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a surging yen forced Japanese multinationals to scurry offshore in search of cheap 
labor.175 According to China Daily, China's trade with Japan will reach US$24 
billion in 1992, up from US$20.2 billion in 1991 and making Japan China's second 
largest trading partner in Asia after Hong Kong. Furthermore, as a result of Chinese 
imports of Japanese technology and machinery, Chinese technological imports from 
Japan will surpass US$1 billion, according to Mr. Wei Xiaorong, deputy director of 
the Asian and African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Relations. While the total Chinese imports from Japan reached US$5.4 billion for the 
period of January through June 1992，up 33.5 percent from the same period in 1991， 
Chinese exports to Japan rose 13.8 percent to US$4.8 billion during this period.^ ^^ 
On the rise also is Japanese investments on a contractual basis-according to 
Chinese statistics, Japanese investment soared to just over US$1 billion in the first 
three months of 1992, which is a 500 percent increase compared to the same period 
in 1991. And these increases come at a time when Japanese overseas direct 
investment overall has been subsiding due to domestic economic s l o w d o w n . 
Chinese statistics show that Japan ranks third among investors in China in terms of 
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commitment. The total promised Japanese investment in the period for the first 
quarter of 1992 was up 600 percent to US$460 million from the corresponding period 
last year.178 
One such development project is the Yangpu free trade zone port on the 
northwestern coast of Hainan Island. In May 1992 Kumagai Gumi (Hong Kong), a 
consortium of Hong Kong, United States, South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese 
companies (35 percent of the company is owned by the Japanese construction 
company of the same name) signed the contract to develop 30km2 of land leased for 
70 years for a heavy manufacturing base. During the first two years a power plant, 
water facilities, housing, roads and telecommunications will be built for approximately 
HK$2.5 billion-altogether HK$18 billion is to be spent over a 15 year period to 
complete to project.^^^ 
Cooperation continues in the petroleum and steel industries. On May 23 1992 
a joint seismic survey team began operations to explore for oil and gas resources in 
the Tarim Basin-this marks the first occasion that China and Japan have joined forces 
for oil and gas exploration. The Japanese are investing over US$60 million on the 
project which will take place over the next four and a half years.^ ^^ The Tarim 
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Basin is estimated to be China's largest basin (covering 560,000km2) filled with 
abundant oil and gas reserves.^ ^^ In addition, a Sino-Japanese venture (Japan-China 
Oil Development Corporation) will explore two offshore oil fields in Bohai Bay jointly 
with a Chinese state-run company. Financial assistance for the project will come from 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation and a Japanese consortium consisting of five 
oil exploration companies. Estimated reserves are 400 million tons to be divided 
equally between the two countries.^^^ 
Nippon Steel Corporation announced the conclusion of an agreement in Beijing 
for technical cooperation in a project to expand the silicon steel sheet mill of Wuhan 
Iron and Steel Corporation, one of China's major steelworks. The 20 billion Yen 
contract calls for the supply of main facilities and technology to double the firm's 
annual electrical sheet production capacity to 200,000 t o n s， 
Bilateral cooperation is also taking place in the area of environmental and 
cultural protection projects. On 2 June 1992 China and Japan signed an agreement 
whereby Japan will award US$21.8 million to finance these projects in China. Of the 
total aid, US$15.1 million will be spent for the Japan-China Friendship Environmental 
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Protection Centre, part of a general agreement signed last year for Japan to give 
US$80.9 million for the project which is Japan's first investment in China to focus on 
environmental protection.^^ 
Despite the surge in trade figures and Japanese foreign investment into China, 
Japanese figures show 1991 direct foreign investment to China in the amount of 
US$246,579 million, as consisting of only 1.4 percent of their world total.^ ^^ 
Furthermore, the Chinese are still not satisfied with the level of high technology 
transfers from Japan. On 11 June 1992，China called on Japan to scrap curbs on high 
tech transfers under the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Export Control 
(COCOM). COCOM regulations, according to Li Lanqing, Chinese minister of 
foreign economic relations and trade, block China from importing high technology and 
state-of-the-art facilities from Japan are out of date. In Tokyo, an official at MITI 
ruled out any possibility of Japan lifting its COCOM regulations regarding China. 
MITI said that China's communist system has not changed, despite its economic 
reforms.186 
On the defense front, an idea has surfaced within the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry on a "joint Japan-China PKO in Cambodia"--the idea is to let Japanese Self-
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Defense Forces (SDF) units and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) units to 
jointly repair the Phnom Penh International Airport with the aim of deepening mutual 
understanding in view of the fact that China has asked Japan to deal cautiously with 
its participation in the PKO.^ ^^ 
According to an article in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun dated 3 August 1992，the 
Japanese government intends to open preparatory talks with the Chinese early next 
year. The article states: 
The government has begun planning Japan-China security talks 
concerning military personnel. Japan thinks that confidence-building 
measures should be taken between Japan and China for ensuring 
security in post-cold war Asia. Chinese forces are rapidly modernizing 
their equipment with weapons imported from the former Soviet Union. 
Also, they are showing their intention to merge in the South China sea 
area. The government thinks such moves by China "are creating 
uncertainty in Asia by upsetting the military balance in the region" (as 
noted by a senior Foreign Ministry official). Japan intends to ease 
China's foresighted defense policy by seeking common perceptions in 
the international situation, and to call for the nation's self-restraint in 
military expansion... 
Japan is concerned about recent moves by the Chinese forces because 
they look like "actions intended to fill a 'power vacuum' created by US 
and Russian withdrawal from post-Cold War Asia" (as noted by the 
senior Foreign Ministry official). 
Some Chinese leaders, however, are advocating a defense buildup to 
cope with the "Japanese threat." Taking into account such 
circumstances, the government thinks that "the two nations should build 
up mutual confidence through frank consultations involving both civilian 
and military personnel" (as noted by a Foreign Ministry official in 





Nearly 33 years after the end of World War II，China and Japan were brought 
together in 1978 by favorable domestic environments at a time when both had 
seemingly highly compatible economic and security interests. During that year, the 
Long-Term Trade Agreement and the Peace and Friendship Treaty were signed 
between the two. However, due to numerous factors-including culture, politics, 
economics, and history--Sino-Japanese relations have reached heights of euphoria as 
well as the lower reaches of hell within short periods of time. My research has led 
me to believe that two of these factors play more heavily on each country's 
perceptions of the other-history and culture. Heated issues of contention have 
suddenly come up between the two neighbors, especially over Japan's past 
aggressions and lingering fears of the revival of Japanese militarism. 
The first decade of the reform era was an exciting and prosperous ten years 
in Chinese history. Deng Xiaoping, who was rehabilitated in 1977, soon came to 
wield the most power in China and effectively led the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) along a path of pragmatic economic and political reforms and to an 
unprecedented degree of openness to the West. Japan, a close neighbor of China 
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and technologically and economically well-equipped to assist China in its 
modernization program, has naturally played a very important role in China's pursuit 
of economic and security-related goals. 
Looking back over the first decade following 1978, substantial progress can 
be pointed to in the areas of trade, joint ventures, cultural and educational 
exchanges, and increased mutual understanding in the bilateral relationship. We 
have also seen, however, that while the relationship has been improving, it has also 
fluctuated considerably between positive and negative degrees of cordiality. These 
inconsistencies can be explained by the four themes: 1) differing economic 
expectations, 2) changing perceptions of the global balance of power, 3) the effects 
of domestic politics and internal control for power, and 4) the dichotomy of 
commonality versus a history of hatred. We will turn once again to these themes to 
understand current issues in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Differing Economic Expectations. 
Sino-Japanese relations have been complicated by differing economic 
expectations and concerns. A review of the ten year period between 1978 and 1988 
shows that the most economically profitable periods in the bilateral relationship to 
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Japan occurred in 1978-1979 and 1984-1986--but these were the most damaging 
periods to China's domestic economy. The first period was under the original 
provisions of the LTTA when it seemed that China would import a lot of heavy 
industrial equipment from Japan. The second period consisted of China's lifting 
import barriers and was flooded as a result by Japanese consumer goods. Both 
periods ultimately led to rapid depletion of China's foreign exchange reserves. 
Ideally, Japan would like to sell huge amounts of consumer goods to China. 
The Japanese value the chance of setting up production facilities in China to take 
advantage of low labor costs. The imports that Japan is most interested in are 
natural resources, specifically high quality crude oil. 
China, however, has trouble obliging these desires. Imports need to be 
balanced by exports, and China is severely limited in its ability to provide Japan with 
enough oil due to the PRC's own energy shortages, and the lack of means for 
exploration and refining. China is also worried about having too much foreign 
influence within its boundaries as might result if Japanese investors were allowed a 
high degree of autonomy in the operation of their ventures in China.�89 And as 
Japan continues to flex its economic muscle around the world, particularly in Asia, 
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it remains to be seen how far China will permit Japan to go before she sees her vital 
interests threatened, vis-a-vis competition for markets. 
China would ideally like to increase high technology imports from Japan so 
that she could embark on efficient, high-industrial export production. The Japanese, 
however, worry about a "boomerang effect"--that China may become a tough export 
competitor and begin to out-do Japanese goods-and are thus hesitant to provide too 
much advanced technology. Japan has provided China with a large amount of low 
interest loans, but has been careful to finance projects that would he beneficial to 
Japanese domestic industries. Japan has also been confronted with contract 
cancellations and has been disappointed by the degree of Chinese bureaucracy and 
red-tape that has impeded its investment efforts in the PRC. However, progress was 
made with the new Sino-Japanese Contract Law which helped to insure the safety 
of foreign investments. 
These differences in economic expectations have caused disappointment and 
friction on both sides. However, despite the many obstacles that have confronted 
Sino-Japanese economic relations, the accomplishments are still remarkable. Overall 
trade and Japanese investment in the PRC has been beneficial to both sides, and the 
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tolerance and patience that has been exercised when conflicts did arise has been 
impressive. 
If Japan continues to invest for the long-term benefits of its relationship with 
China，and if China continues on a pragmatic course of modernization, then Sino-
Japanese economic cooperation will surely be even more impressive in the future 
than they are to date. 
Changing Perceptions of the Global Balance of Power. 
We have noted how changes in the balance of power have affected each 
countries policies toward the other. The Cold War, in particular the Soviet threat, 
was the corner-stone for mutual security interests. From 1978 to 1980，China was 
quite active in encouraging Japan to increase its defense expenditures, but from 1981 
to 1984 China kept fairly quiet on this issue perhaps due to the more militarily 
assertive Japanese leadership under Yasuhiro Nakasone. From 1985 onward, China 
has actually been more outspoken against further Japanese military actions. This is 
even more evident following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the passing of this 
year's PKO bill in Japan. 
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Japan in turn, although perpetually reminded by China and other Asian 
neighbors that suffered from war time aggression and by domestic opposition against 
rearming, has been seeking to play a more prominent role in the international 
community to match its economic role. This is given even more emphasis by the 
Japanese government in light of the power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific region due to 
Soviet withdrawal and requests by the United States for burden-sharing on defense 
issues. In addition, the Japanese are concerned by what appears to be aggressive 
moves by the Chinese particularly in the South China Sea area，Chinese arms 
exports, and military build-up. 
Domestic Politics and the Competition for Power. 
The loss of influence of Hua Guofeng and his supporters in 1979 and 1980， 
and the increasing influence of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, resulted in a drastic 
change in China's economic policies that directly effected relations with Tokyo given 
the billions of dollars of contracts that were at stake. Strained relations with Japan 
during 1985 and 1986 were also partially due to challenges to Deng Xiaoping and 
his open-door policy. In these instances, Japan served as a useful scapegoat for both 
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Deng，s opponents, who accused him of rendering China susceptible to the evil 
economic exploits of the Japanese, and by Deng himself, who criticized Japanese 
trade practices as a means of transferring the blame for China's economic difficulties 
away from his leadership. 
In Japan, domestic politics has had the greatest impact on Sino-Japanese 
relations through changes in defense spending. Because of the strong public 
mandate of the Liberal Democratic Party under the leaderships of Prime Ministers 
Suzuki and Nakasone, both individuals were able to make visits to the Yasukuni war 
shrine during their tenures. These symbolic "accomplishments," while playing on 
nationalistic feelings in Japan, contributed to the image of Japan as being 
threatening to China. An image that was much touted in the textbook controversy 
of 1982 and the anti-Japanese student protests in 1985. This image is still used by 
Chinese political leaders as a means of expressing dissatisfaction over various 
Japanese policies. However, as Japan shifts its focus to a more broader international 
role, such tactics by the Chinese may eventually lose their edge. 
In addition, Japanese domestic politics have also played an important role in 
Japanese trade with China. For example, in protecting its coal industry, Japan has 
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limited its ability to purchase Chinese coal—although this coal is considerably 
cheaper than Japanese domestic coal. Conversely, because of the stronger influence 
of the steel industry, Japanese oil refiners were forced to buy low quality Chinese 
crude as part of the LTTA in 1978. 
The Dichotomy of Commonality Versus a History of Hatred. 
Much of Japan's economic success in China can be attributed to Japan's close 
proximity to the PRC and the cultural similarities between the two countries. In 
China，the Americans and Germans seem to have a better reputation than Japan in 
the realm of business ethics and a reputation equal to Japan's for quality of their 
products. However, because the Japanese have an acute understanding of Chinese 
social etiquette and Chinese bureaucracy, and an ability to form long-term personal 
relationships with important Chinese officials, Japan has been able to out-market 
American and European competitors.^^^ 
At the same time, commonalities between China and Japan have led both 
sides to be over-optimistic in determining the degree of economic compatibility as 
well as shared interests between the two countries. This was illustrated by China's 
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expectations that it could finance imports of Japanese technology and the 
development of heavy industries through its oil and coal exports—this proved to be 
disappointingly wrong for both sides. 
In contrast to the feeling of commonality is a history of lingering resentment 
that continues to complicate present-day relations. The Japanese textbook 
controversies of 1982 and 1986，China's 50th anniversary commemoration of the 
Japanese invasion in 1985; the visits by Japanese prime ministers to Yasukuni 
Shrine; current demands for war reparations; and the unresolved sovereignty dispute 
over the Senkaku Islands show that memories of conflict between the two countries 
are still very much alive and have been an impediment to the development of good 
relations. 
Thus, we have seen some of the major contradictions and stumbling blocks 
in the Sino-Japanese relationship. As both nations prepare to enter what many 
analysts predict to be the Pacific Century, it appears that both countries are making 
attempts to put aside the past and move forward in a cooperative relationship. The 
unprecedented upcoming visit by a Japanese emperor to China and the flurry of 
exchanges that have taken place on both sides in a lead up to this historical event 
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indicate this mutual desire by China and Japan. Both sides have much to gain 
through continued cooperation in maintaining a peaceful and friendly relationship. 
However, caution must be given in being overly optimistic in assessing the 
relationship. Shifts in the global and regional balances of power, both on a security 
as well as economic level, will heavily influence perceptions and policies of each 
country. Likewise, shifts in the domestic political and economic arenas could also 
prove unsettling. 
While both countries have much to gain from continuing to strive for greater 
cooperation with the other, each side is pursuing agendas that are independently 
guided by their own interests—that is, while taking into account overall concerns to 
maintain peace and stability, both China and Japan will follow policies that are best 
for their respective countries. Memories of the past take a long time to heal, and 
China in particular will be overshadowed by its recent history of Western and 
Japanese imperialism, and aggression by those countries against her. One must 
remember that it took twenty-seven years after the end of World War II for the two 
countries to reestablish diplomatic ties in 1972. And as the above research and 
analysis indicates, the twenty years since have been fraught with upsets despite great 
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strides in the relationship. 
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